r 

1EADE 

DNGREss, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, j Report 
3 23 'ession. j j No. 534 # 

34 
912 
opy 2 

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


April 22, 1912. —Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union and ordered to be printed. 


//,<T Cry , < / 

Mr. Hobson, | from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted 

the following 

REPORT 


[To accompany H. R. 1309.] 

The Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 
(H. R. 1309) to establish a council of national defense, having had 
the same under consideration, report the same to the House with 
the following amendments, and recommend that the amendments be 
adopted and that the bill as amended do pass: 

Page 1, lines 4 and 5, strike out the words 1 ‘Secretary of War, who 
shall be president of the council,” and insert in lieu thereof the fol¬ 
lowing : 

President of the United States, who shall be ex officio president of the council; the 
Secretary of State, who shall preside in the absence of the President; the Secretary of 
War. 

Page 2, lines 1 and 2, strike out the words 11 the aid for operations 
of the fleet of the Navy,” and insert in lieu thereof the following: 

An officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain to be designated by the Secre¬ 
tary of the Navy. 

Page 2, after line 3, add a new section, as follows: 

Sec. 2. The chairmen of the several committees of the Senate and House of Repre¬ 
sentatives herein named shall act as members of the council until their successors have 
been selected. 

Page 2, section 2, strike out the section and add the following: 

Sec. 3. That said council shall report to the President for transmission to Congress 
a general policy of national defense and such recommendation of measures relating 
thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient. 

Page 2, section 3, at the end of line 11, insert the following: 

Provided , That in the time of war said council shall meet only upon the call of the 
President of the United States. 

Page 2, line 10, strike out the words “Sec. 3” and insert in lieu 
thereof the words “Sec. 4.” <L^-n 







2 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


V' / 

y 

v\/r\ 

Page 2, section 3, line 12, after the word “Provided,’’ insert “fur- 


ther 

Page 2, section 3, line 13, strike out the words “except in time of 
war.” 

Page 2, section 3, line 3 4, strike out all after the word “ that ’ and 
strike out all of lines 15, 16, and 17, and insert in lieu thereof: 


The council may summon for consultation at any of its meetings any citizen of the 
United States, and upon request by the council the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Navy shall order any officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to appear 
before the council for consultation. 


Page 2, line 18, strike out the words “Sec. 4” and insert in lieu 
thereof the words “Sec. 5.” 

Page 3, line 2, after the word “session,” insert the following: 

And the necessary expenses of all persons summoned. 

The bill as amended reads as follows: 


A BILL To establish a council of national defense. 


Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled , That there is hereby established a council of national defense, 
consisting of the President of the United States, who shall be ex officio president of the 
council; the Secretary of State, who shall preside in the absence of the President; the 
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the chairman of the Committee on Appro¬ 
priations of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, the chair¬ 
man of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee 
on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on 
Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Army, an officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain to be designated by the 
Secretary of the Navy, the president of the Army War College, and the president of 
the Navy War College. 

Sec. 2. The chairmen of the several committees of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives herein named shall act as members of the council until their succes¬ 
sors have been selected. 

Sec. 3. That said council shall report to the President, for transmission to Congress, 
a general policy of national defense and such recommendations or measures relating 
thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient. 

Sec. 4. That said council shall meet at, least once in each calendar year, on such 
date or dates as it shall fix: Provided , That in time of war said council shall meet 
only upon the call of the President of the United States: Provided further , That special 
meetings may be called by the president of the council: And provided further , That 
the council may summon for consultation at any of its meetings any citizen of the 
United States, and upon request by the council the Secretary of War and the Sec¬ 
retary of the Navy shall order any officer of Ihe Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to 
appear before the council for consultation. 

Sec. 5. That for carrying out the purposes of this act there is hereby appro¬ 
priated, out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of 
twenty thousand dollars, to be available until expended, and to be expended upon 
vouchers signed by the president of the council: Provided , That all necessary expenses 
of the chairmen of committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, 
when called to attend meetings of said council when Congress is not in session, and 
the necessary expenses of all persons summoned shall be paid from this appropriation 
upon approval by the president of the council. 

This bill is approved by the President of the United States, by the 
late Secretary of War, by the present Secretary of War, the Secretary of 
the Navy, and without exception officers of high rank, knowledge, 
imd experience of both the Army and Navy. The council entails 
practically no cost. A similar council has been established in every 
other great nation in the world 

n, OF m 

/tTY o:,p«19 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


3 


The President, in a message to this Congress, says: 

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 

I urge again upon Congress the desirability of establishing the council of national 
defense. The bill to establish this council was before Congress last winter, and it is 
hoped that this legislation will pass during the present session. The purpose of the 
council is to determine the general policy of national defense and to recommend to 
Congress and to the President such measures relating to it as it shall deem necessary 
and expedient. 

No such machinery is now provided by which the readiness of the Army and Navy 
may be improved and the programs of military and naval requirements shall be 
coordinated and properly scrutinized with a view to the necessities of the whole 
Nation rather than of separate departments. 

The late Secretary of War, to whom was referred H. R. 29371. an 
almost identical bill, states as follows: 

War Department, December 16, 1910. 

Respectfully returned to Hon. George Edmund Foss, Committee on Naval Affairs, 
House of Representatives. 

I approve of the provision of this bill and recommend its enactment into law. 

J. M. Dickinson, Secretary of War. 

The last Secretary of War further stated in a hearing before the 
committee in part as follows: 

1 do desire, however, to avail myself of this opportunity to say that I have considered 
the question and am very heartily in favor of the bill. I think one of the main troubles 
that we have had is that we have not proceeded upon a comprehensive and uniform 
plan in the development of our schemes for military defense. What we have done in 
that line has been largely sporadic, brought forward from time to time upon individual 
suggestion and reflecting more or less the views of some particular Secretary of War, 
so far as the Army is concerned, or the Chief of Staff, and there has never been anv 
system of uniform legislation well thought out, planned, thoroughly studied, and 
proceeded with. 

There are great advantages, I think, to be gotten from the establishment of a board 
of this character. It provides for men of technical information. Then, it has repre¬ 
sented Upon it both branches of the legislative assembly. If the board shall be created, 
I believe that they can adopt a plan which will be utilized and that then all legislation 
will be correlated with that plan. It will proceed then in a systematic way and not 
run out at tangents, as it does now. That is a general statement, Mr. Chairman, of 
my views of the advantages of a bill of this character. 

The legislation that would be the outcome of an investigation by such a board a-< 
this, and recommended by such a board, would command the executive support and 
the legislative support, and it would command the confidence of the country and it 
would not be upset from time to time by legislation that would emanate merely from 
some individual standpoint. I think that it would result in great economy and great 
efficiency. 

The present Secretary of War, in his annual report dated December 
4, 1911, states as follows: 

The House Committee on Naval Affairs has submitted a favorable report upon a bill 
to establish a council of national defense. This bill is approved by the President of the 
United States and the Secretary of the Navy. Its duties are to make practicable the 
formulation and execution of a consistent and continuing policy of national defense, to 
help in coordinating the plans of the Army and Navy, and furnish a means of coordi¬ 
nating military and financial questions before submitting to the President and to 
Congress recommendations for measures of national defense. It is hoped that this bill 
will receive favorable consideration during the present session of Congress. 

The Secretary of the Navy states as follows, referring to a similar 
bill: 

Department of the Navy, 
Washington, December 27, 1910. 

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th instant trans¬ 
mitting a bill (H. R. 29371) to establish a council of national defense, and requesting 
the views and recommendations of this department thereon. 


4 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


The proposed bill is regarded as very desirable to the Navy in that it would make 
practicable the formulation and execution of a consistent and continuing policy of 
national defense; it would help to coordinate the plans of the Army and Navy and 
furnish a means of reconciling the military and financial interests before submitting 
to the President and the Congress recommendations for measures of national defense; 
and would furnish the President and the Congress a ready means of ascertaining at any 
time the condition of the Nation for defense. 

Favorable consideration of this bill is recommended. 

G. v. L. Meyer, 

Secretary of the Navy. 

Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, 

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 

Again, in a hearing before the committee on May 19, 1911, the 
Secretary of the Navy said in part: 

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, in war nothing fails like failure. 
Now, in order to have success we must have efficiency. To have efficiency we must 
have a definite policy; and to bring about a definite policy, we have to have coopera¬ 
tion and coardination of Congress, the Army, and the Navy. To bring about this 
cooperation, we have to have an intelligent understanding. 

Now, this national council of defense bill is made up of two Cabinet officers, four 
Senators, four Congressmen, two Army officers, and two naval officers. It would seem 
that this council would tend toward'and result in an intelligent understanding and 
assist in cooperation of Congress to a definite policy. I can not help feeling, after due 
consideration, that this council would result in a definite policy and would encourage 
cooperation, and would increase efficiency as well as economy. 

The President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, should be a member 
ex officio of this board. I say this without consulting the President. I do not know 
whether or not that has come to the attention of the committee. 

Again, the Secretary of the Navy, in a hearing before the committee 
on March 1, 1912, said in part: 

We feel that this council of national defense will be an additional benefit to the 
Navy, to the country, and to the Nation. It will, in a way, be a vehicle between 
the department and Congress. There will be representatives in this council from 
the Congress and from the departments of the Army and Navy, and they will be in 
touch with exactly what the future requirements may be in the Army and the Navy, 
and it will enable them to be in council with the two departments. 

In that way it will keep the departments and Congress in touch with each other 
and encourage continuity of policy, which is of vital importance to the best results. 

I will not go into the details of the bill, because it is all in the hearing which took 
place May 19, 1911, when Secretary of War Dickinson, the Secretary of the Navy, 
Admiral Mahan, Gen. Wood, Admiral Wainwright, Gen. Wotherspoon, president of 
the Army War College, and a number of officers from both the Army and Navy were 
present. The departmental heads of the Army and Navy are in sympathy with it 
and the President is also in sympathy with it. 

In other countries—in England, and particularly in Germany and Japan—they are 
working out in advance policies for the next few years. If Congress were more in 
touch with the aims and objects of those two departments and felt that they thor¬ 
oughly understood them, they could in turn inform and keep informed, not only in 
an intelligent way, but in a sympathetic way, the Representatives of Congress, and 
thus be of great benefit in furthering proper and necessary legislation. I hope the 
committee will give this matter further consideration. 

Sections 1 and 2 of the bill establish a council of national defense, 
composed of six officials of the legislative branch of the Government, 
four officials of the executive branch, and four technical and expert 
officers of high rank, two in the Army and two in the Navy. The 
officials of the legislative branch are the four chairmen of the two 
service committees, Naval and Military, of the Senate and the House 
of Representatives, and the two chairmen of the Appropriation Com¬ 
mittees of the same. 

The officials of the executive branch of the Government are the 
President, the Secretary of State, and the two Cabinet officers at the 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


5 


head of tlie two services, Naval and Military. The four technical 
officers of the Army and Navy are those charged with duties pertaining 
to high matters of national defense. 

Thus in its composition the council brings together the officials 
charged with responsibility and most competent to pass on questions 
of national defense and insures unity, continuity, and cooperation 
heretofore impossible and the lack of which has entailed added 
expense and lowered efficiency in all branches of national defense. 

Section 3 makes it the duty of the council to report a general policy 
of national defense and to recommend measures for carrying out the 
same. Under present conditions there is no authoritative official 
or body of officials to perform this important function. The lack of 
a definite policy at the time of and during our past wars has always 
entailed enormous outlay of treasure, loss of life, and at times has cost 
us victory on the battle field. 

The necessity of having a definite policy worked out in advance of 
war has become of greater and greater importance in the conduct of 
modern war. Indeed, it is not overdrawing the facts to say that 
victory in modern war has invariably gone to the side of the nation 
with its policy the best determined. 

The experience of these modern wars has caused all important 
nations to develop a council of national defense with duties similar to 
those prescribed in this section. This is noticeable in the cases of the 
two last wars, the Russo-Japanese War and the Boer War. Both 
Russia and Great Britain found the lack of a definite, carefully pre¬ 
pared policy chiefly responsible for their reverses. 

The composition and duties of the similar councils abroad are as 
follows: 

For Great Britain, including India, the name of the council is “The 
committee on imperial defense.” 

GREAT BRITAIN, INCLUDING INDIA. 

The committee on imperial defense. 

The defense committee, assisted by a small secretariat, will deal with questions of 
national defense and will foresee imperial requirements. 

The prime minister, who is president of the committee, and the secretarial staff 
are the only permanent members of the defense committee. The other officials who 
attend the meetings do so by invitation, and invitations are sent out for each meeting. 

The members who ordinarily attend the meetings of the defense committee are: 
The prime minister, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, the secretary of state for 
war, the secretary of state for India, the chancellor of the exchequer, the first lord of 
the admiralty, the first sea lord of the admiralty, the director of naval intelligence, 
the chief of the general staff, the director of military operations, Lord Esher, and Gen. 
Sir John French. Other members of the cabinet and officials who possess special 
knowledge on subjects under consideration are asked to attend meetings of the com¬ 
mittee from time to time. 

The secretariat, or, as it is sometimes called, the “permanent nucleus,” was ap¬ 
pointed with a view to insure continuity of work and that a record of work done might 
be kept for the information of succeeding committees. 

The following statements, made in the House by the present and late prime min¬ 
isters on August 2, 1906, will show r clearly the status and functions of the committee: 

Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman said: 

“The defense committee act as the expert advisers of the Government in regard to 
technical questions. 

“It was for the cabinet to determine their political policy, and then it was for the 
expert members of the defense committee to furnish them with the information as to 
how r they were to carry out their policy. Questions of high policy were beyond the 
ken of the committee of imperial defense. It was no part of the duty of the committee 


6 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


to pronounce an opinion on the general policy of Ihe Government, either naval or 
military.” 

Mr. Balfour said: 

“The committee was summoned by the prime minister to assist him in dealing with 
matters outside the purview of a single department, and it was the prime minister’s 
business to choose which heads of departments he would summon, and what experts 
were to be brought in * * *. There was a natural elasticity in the committee of 

defense depending on the problems to be dealt with, and the prime minister of the day 
must decide for himself whose advice he would take." (Organization and Equip¬ 
ment, Lieut. Col. Brunker.) 

FRANCE. 

Decree relative to the establishment of a supreme board of national defense. 

Paris, April 3, 1903. 

Article 1. A supreme board of national defense is instituted for the examination 
of all questions requiring the cooperation of two or more ministerial departments. 

Art. 5. The supreme board of national defense shall be composed of: The president 
of the board of ministers, presiding; the minister of foreign affairs; the minister of 
finance; the minister of war; the minister of marine; the minister for the colonies. 

Art. 6. The chief of staff of the army, the chief of staff of the navy, and the presi¬ 
dent of the consultative committee for colonial defense shall be present at meetings of 
the supreme board with deliberative voice. 

GERMANY. 

In order that the whole undivided strength of the fleet may be successfully employed 
in the destruction of the enemy and in defending our coasts, it is necessary that the 
army and the navy should have a common commander in chief, whom the German 
Empire possesses in His Majesty the Emperor. The navy, as well as the army, must 
receive its instructions from the great headquarters, and this will be taken into con¬ 
sideration in the composition of the latter. 

****** * 

In view of the importance of the German fleet at the present day and of the still 
greater importance which it will have in the future, the chief of the staff of the navy 
and the chief of the naval cabinet with their staffs will in future be attached to the 
headquarters staff in order to insure the cooperation of the navy with the army. 

* * * _ * * * * 

To some extent the two services already work together in peace time. This is the 
case as regards the enlistment of sailors by the military administrative circles, the 
joint action of the admiralty, the war office, and the general staff of the army on 
mobilization, the defense of our coasts, and so forth; but these joint duties are of 
little assistance in making the services better acquainted with one another, since 
they affect but a small number of officers of each branch. 

Something has been effected in this direction by the practice, recently introduced, 
of appointing naval officers to the army staff, and vice versa; of detailing joint com¬ 
mittees of naval and military officers; and of selecting officers to attend the maneuvers 
of the sister service; but much more than this is required to instill into all ranks of 
the army and of the navy the necessity for combined action and mutual support in 
war. (The Duties of the General Staff, 1905, Gen. Bronsart von Schellendorff.) 

The great successes of Germany in the wars of 1866 and 1870 were 
chiefly due to the policy and preparations resulting from the coopera¬ 
tion of the civil and the military embodied in Bismarck, the states¬ 
man, and Yon Moltke, the soldier. 

RUSSIA. 

Board of national defense. 

(This and a great general staff were created by the Emperor of Russia as a result of 
the experience of the Russo-Japanese War.) 

The board of national defense is charged with the study of questions which relate to 
the security of the Empire. It acts under the direct orders of the Emperor and is 
made up of a president and six permanent members — all named by the Emperor_but 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


7 


has also a certain number of other members, some on account of the offices which they 
hold, as the ministers of war and of the navy, the chief of the general staff, the chief of 
the great general staff of the navy, and the inspectors of the army, and others because 
of their personal knowledge or because of the needs of the service as, for example, 
ministers, commanders of army corps, etc. 

The board of national defense has the following duties: 

(a) Study of general measures so that a fixed plan may be determined upon by the 
ministers of war and of the navy in order to assure the development of the military 
power of the Empire in conformity to the political ends which it is desired to accom¬ 
plish. 

( b) To watch that these measures are carried out as soon as they have the approval 
of the Emperor. 

(c) Study of propositions emanating from the military ministers and conforming 
them in order that all resources may be employed in time of war and unification and 
direction of all preliminary measures. 

(tf) Study of modifications which it is desirable to make in the plans of the two 
military ministers. 

(e) Study and solution of the questions of the fitness of the different branches of the 
administration and the differences which exist in them from the standpoint of national 
defense. 

The board of national defense has no executive power, but is limited to recommen¬ 
dations to the Emperor. The execution of measures which receive the approval of the 
Emperor is in charge of the minister of war. The president has direct communication 
with the Emperor, and speaks as his mouthpiece when he presides in the board. Said 
president forms a part by virtue of his office of the imperial council and of the council 
of ministers. He has the right to ask from the various ministers anything which can 
contribute to the work of the board, and receives from the minister of war, of the navy, 
and of foreign affairs information relating to the national defense. All the delibera¬ 
tions and actions of the board are considered as state secrets. (Revista Oientifico- 
Militar y Biblioteca Militar, 25 Septiembre, 1905.) 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

In Austria-Hungary there is no minister of the navy. The minister of war of the 
monarchy has in his charge questions relating to the navy. On this account the 
bureaus of the navy constitute a section attached to the ministry of war. (L’Etat 
Militaire des Principales Puissances Etrangeres en 1902, Lauth.) 

ITALY. 

By a decree of the 16th of July, 1897, the Supreme Mixed Commission for the Defense 
of the Empire was organized. This is charged with the duty of giving advice on all 
important questions concerning the defense of Italy. The Duke of Genoa is president; 
the members are: The admiral president of the superior council of the navy, the 
generals designated to command the various armies in case of war, the admirals desig¬ 
nated to command the fleets, and the chief of the general staff of the army and of the 
navy. The generals, the commanders of army corps, the inspectors general and 
admirals, when it appears that their presence will be useful, may be invited to attend 
the meetings of the commission for consultation only. (L’Etat Militaire des Princi¬ 
pales Puissance Etrangeres en 1902, Lauth.) 

SPAIN. 

Spain has a consultative board for war whiAi is concerned with the large questions 
in reference to preparation for war, etc. The organization and the composition of 
this board are regulated by decisions made in the council of ministers. (L’Etat 
Militaire des Principales Puissances Etrangeres en 1902, Lauth.) 

JAPAN. 

The supreme military council. 


This was created in 1898 as the highest advisory body on naval and military mat¬ 
ters to the Emperor. It was made up of six members, three army and three navy 
officers of the highest rank. 


8 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


The supreme council of war. 

This is a special office created on the eve of the outbreak of the late war, and may 
be regarded as the Emperor’s advisers and staff officers on all important matters per¬ 
taining to war. The members of the supreme military council, ministers of war and 
of the navy, chiefs of the general staff, and of the naval staff board are entitled to 
membership by virtue of their official positions. (Japan Year Book, 1907.) 

iii the hearings before the committee the last chairman of the Com¬ 
mittee on Military Affairs, Mr. Hull, made a statement in part as 
follows: 

A board of the kind provided for would be of great benefit to the country at large 
and would enable the Government to pursue a settled policy, and when that policy 
should be changed it would only be after very mature deliberation. 

I heard the question of my colleague from Iowa [Mr. Dawson], and I can not see 
any objection to creating a board of this character whose action is simply advisory. 
It can not have any effect until Congress acts, the same as it did with the Endicott 
Board, the same as it does with plans for improvements at different institutions like 
the Military Academy and the Naval Academy. Congress must first adopt its 
recommendations. 

One great advantage of having a board of this character is. to my mind, to have some 
definite policy decided on. I do not know whether the Navy Department changes 
its mind very often or not, but the War Department changes its mind very often, and 
we are pushed into a line of legislation under one Chief of Staff, and when the head 
of the bureau changes or a new Chief of Staff comes in he urges sometimes a different 
line from that urged by his predecessor. 

Our whole system would be steadied if there was a board composed of these experts 
of the Army and Navy and the Members of Congress who have charge of these matters. 
In my judgment, the whole line of legislation would be steadied and benefited by the 
creation of this board. We can not conceive that there is any constitutional objection 
to creating it, and, as it is not a board that has absolute power to go ahead and do 
things, I can not conceive of any objections to both the experts and Members of Con¬ 
gress being joined together to get information. Personally, I think it is a splendid 
bill, and I should like to see it adopted. It will not cost us much; it will be of benefit 
to the Government: and we do need something in the way of a permanent policy of 
defense, and then let Congress carry it out; or, if the time comes to change it, we do 
need more than one man’s technical ideas, no matter who he may be, before we can 
change it. You will never succeed in getting a continuous line of work unless you 
have some permanent authority, that Congress will have confidence in after it has 
been tested, or abolish it if you do not have confidence in it. 

I do believe in the bill, and I believe it is one of the best things you can do to get 
a board that can have some permanency and adopt some permanent policy and quit 
this makeshift we have been suffering from. 

I do want to see this act put in some shape where the vast sums we expend will be 
beneficial for the country as a whole, not only for this year, but growing up each year, 
with better results each year for our defenses, and getting results for the money we 
appropriate for the national defense. We are not doing it now. There has been a 
wonderful advance in the Army for the last four or five years. We are getting a better 
system all the time, and yet it has not that steadiness of purpose it ought to have and 
will have, in my judgment, if we adopt this bill. 

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, United States Army, Chief of the General 
Staff, made a statement in part as follows: 

I believe thoroughly in the bill. I consider it to be the most important measure 
for military efficiency that has come up for consideration since I have had anything 
whatever to do with my present duties in Washington, and probably one of the most 
important that has ever come up. My reasons for making this statement so strong 
are as follows: If we succeed in having this bill enacted into law, it means that we 
shall have a committee consisting of the elements directly interested in the preparation 
and maintenance of national defense. It will insure the military proposition, and by 
“military” I mean the propositions advanced by the naval and military authorities, 
being considered by a committee in which both Houses of Congress and the President’s 
Cabinet are strongly represented, and it means that matters which are approved by 
this committee will be presented to Congress under an indorsement guaranteeing to 
that body that four of its own Members and two officers of the Cabinet, all civilians, 
have very carefully considered the measure and believe in it and recommend its 
enactment. 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


9 


It is well known to all of us that officers of the Army and Navy are generally looked 
upon as being- a little overenthusiastic in military matters, and I believe that the 
effect of a joint committee of this sort taking up and considering questions of policy 
will, if it approves them, bring these matters before Congress in a much stronger way 
than we could possibly do it ourselves. It means, moreover, that we shall be able to 
establish and maintain a general military policy. The committee will change its 
membership gradually. We shall be able to adopt a general policy and carry it out 
from one administration to another without the radical changes which occur at the 
present time. 

A committee of this sort will insure a continuity of policy and a harmonizing, I 
think, of the military policy of the Government; it will provide a body in which the 
civilian element outnumbers the military, and whatever it approves is bound, I think, 
to appeal very strongly to Congress. I think it will be safe, sane, and strong for the 
betterment of the national defense. 

Admiral Richard Wainwright, United States Navy, late aid for 
operations of the fleet, made a statement in part as follows: 

1 am entirely in favor of the objects of the bill. 1 believe they will promote both 
efficiency and economy. With the same amount of money we should get more efficient 
military and naval forces; or for the same efficiency we should do it for less money. 
I think the object is to better bring before the Members of both Houses the require¬ 
ments of the country, and then they would determine how much their resources were 
to be turned into preparation. I think, after the first formulation of the policy, there 
would not be a necessity of many meetings. Of course from time to time the circum¬ 
stances of the country would change, its foreign relations, and so forth, that might 
require changes in the broad policy. And, of course, each year the question of how 
much should be recommended to do in that year—that is, broadly, between all the 
services taken together—would have to be largely determined by the Members who 
are representing the Senate and House. 

I can not see why there should be any emergency meetings of this council. Of 
course, it would be better if the council could meet a little prior to the session of Con¬ 
gress, as Mr. Padgett suggested, because they are very busy when Congress meets, and 
it would take a little time to carry it out. The English imperial council of defense was 
organized in 1895. 

Mr. Hobson. Right there, will you explain why they came to organize that council 
in England? 

Admiral Wainwright. The 1895 one? 

Mr. Hobson. Yes; and the subsequent one. 

Admiral Wainwright. The object of the subsequent one was more apparent. In 
1895 there were no technical men in the council, and they felt they were not spending 
their money to the best advantage. They saw certain deficiencies in both army and 
navy. 

Mr. Bates. May I ask how that council was constituted; from what personnel? 

Admiral Wainwright. In 1895 the president of the council, the prime minister, 
the secretary of state for war, and the first lord of the admiralty. 

Mr. Bates. Were there members of Parliament in that council? 

Admiral Wainwright. The first lord of admiralty is a member of Parliament; the 
prime minister is a member of Parliament; the secretary of state for war is a member 
of Parliament. The president of the council is probably almost always a member of 
the House of Lords. So they are all legislative men. 

Mr. Roberts. You are speaking of the first council, of 1895? 

Admiral Wainwright. Yes. In 1903, after the Boer War, when they saw how 
deficient the army was, they increased the council by putting in the commander in 
chief of the army, the first naval lord (the first-sea lord) of the admiralty, and the two 
intelligence officers, the officer in charge of military intelligence and the officer in 
charge of naval intelligence. They really represent what our presidents of the War 
College do, except that our president of the War College now has not the Office of 
Naval Intelligence under him. It would be better if he had. 

Mr. Hobson. I want to ask Admiral Wainwright, in connection with his account 
of the second and current council in England, whether the Boer War threw any light 

on the necessity for the council? . 

Admiral Wainwright. The Boer \\ ar was the reason they strengthened then 
council with technical members. Formerly they would call in technical people to 
explain to them the necessities, and after their great troubles in the Boer War they 
found that their army was not properly organized, and they also thought they could 
do better with transportation, and so forth, which was the navy part. They thought 
})Y placing regular technical members on the board the\ could talk more freel\ with 


10 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


Ihe legislative members than it they were called in for a mere hearing. I do not think 
that in any of these boards it can ever become a question of voting. 1 think if the 
legislative members, for instance, did not agree to a policy the recommendation 
would not be made, because it would be ineffective. It would be like cur meetings 
of the joint board. 

Mr. Hobson. Admiral, as to the necessities or needs of that general policy now, do 
you think that it would facilitate settlement of the broad question of naval bases? 

Admiral Wainwright. As to the question of naval bases, naval stations, and forti¬ 
fications, I think both the Army and Navy—a great many of 11 s think there should be 
a uniform policy as to what should he fortified; that the country should not put money 
where it is not needed, in fortifications or in permanent naval stations, and that some 
places may not be neglected; but a uniform policy which would state what we are 
looking forward to I think would be of great value. 

Mr. Hobson. In connection with that arises the question of joint operations of Army 
and Navy in time of war and preparation in time of peace for such matters as trans¬ 
portation. 

Admiral Wainwright. The question of preparation, and how they should cooperate, 
not how they should operate after the war came; that should become technical. 

Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers, president of the Naval War 
College, United States Navy, made a statement in part as follows: 

I think Ihe principle embodied in this bill is most desirable and necessary for us in 
determining any policy of preparation for war. It not only brings together the two 
executive military departments, the Army and Navy Departments, but it brings into 
this council several of the principal representatives of both Houses of Congress to shape 
these policies. Councils similar to the one proposed are found in all the parliamentary 
countries of the world, and the advantage of them has been found to be very great. 
We have not had very much policy heretofore, for anything we got in the way of 
increase was of value; but now that we have developed so widely as we have it seems 
most important that there should be a policy for future development and expenditure 
in preparedness for war, and it seems that a council of this character is the best adapted 
for the purpose. 

Brig. Gen. William W. Wotlierspoon, United States Army, presi¬ 
dent of tlie Army War College, made a statement in part as follows: 

I consider this the most important bill in regard to the military efficiency of the 
country that has ever come under my observation. I say that from the standpoint 
purely of the Army. The great trouble we find at the War College is in ascertaining 
what the policy of Congress, the legislative body, is in regard to military affairs. We 
can only deduce that from its legislative acts. ‘ If we can crystallize that into a few 
brief sentences, it would be this, that Congress expects, on the breaking out of war, 
Ihat the gathering together of untrained, unskilled, and uneducated men will consti¬ 
tute an efficient army for the country. That has always been the course pursued, 
and until we get some council like this probably it will tie continued to be pursued 
The result of that apparent policy has been most disastrous in the past, both finan¬ 
cially and from the point of conservation of our human resources. In the War of 
1812 Great Britain had never at any time on this continent a greater force than 16,500 
soldiers. We mustered into the service 527,000 men, more than half a million. I 11 
1878 we had a pension roll of 78,000 pensioners from the War of 1812, costing over half 
a million more than the entire Regular Army cost in 1811. That is simply an illus¬ 
tration. 

The most important feature, however, of this bill, so far as the Army is concerned 
is this: The Army, drifting along from its old days in Indian campaigning, settled 
down here, there, and everywhere in ihe West and we have posts in the most out-of- 
1 he-way corners you can conceive of, the farthest possible from sources of supply and 
sources of recruits, so that the administration of the Army is enormously expensive 
I conceive that such a board would take this up. 

At another hearing Gen. Wotherspoon said: 

I ( onsider this as decidedly the most important measure that has ever come under 
my observation since I have been in the Army, in forty-odd years I should sav that 
I have been working continuously for the last six years in order to <mt some such 
body as is proposed in this bill to pass authoritatively upon a national poliev with 
regard to national defense. I have been compelled, as president of the War Colleo-e 
m preparing plans to pass from a state of peace to a state of war, to search the records 
to see if there existed such a thing as a military policy in the United States I found 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


11 


no evidence whatever of it. There is nothing that anyone can point to and say, 
“This is the policy the Nation will pursue in the event of war or in the preparation 
for war." In those studies I have seen that the expenditures for the Army are enor¬ 
mous, without results adequate to the cost. We have our Army scattered all over the 
country in the most expensive situations that there are, far from the sources of recruit¬ 
ment, far from the sources of supplies, far from railroad communication, where the 
cost of assembly at any definite point where their services would be required would 
be a great deal more than if we could have a scientific assembly. We have none of 
tin* higher organizations, such as brigades and divisions, which all other nations con¬ 
sider as absolutely essential for military efficiency. I have been in the service for 
40 years, and I have never seen 5,000 men assembled. I have only once had control 
as a general officer of about 4,000 men, and then only for a few weeks in a militia 
camp. 

I have never seen a staff for one of these higher organizations trained. I consider 
that this bill will coordinate the efforts of the Army and the Navy and the legislative 
branch into some unified policy, which will make for decided economy and still 
more decidedly for efficiency. I have stated to this committee before and to the Mili¬ 
tary Committee that I am perfectly convinced that an army three times as efficient and 
probably twice as strong as we have now can be maintained for the money we are at 
present spending for the Army. 1 should regret very much to see this bill fail, because 
it will throw us back to where we have always been, so that when a war comes on the 
first step is to evolve a policy from uncoordinated elements; the next step is to organ¬ 
ize the higher fighting units; the third step, and that we always fail in, is the equip¬ 
ment of those units, f do not know that the committee knows that when the War of 
1S61 1865 came on it was the Secretary of the Treasury that drafted the bill for the 
United States Armv or the Federal Army. The Secretary of War was too busy at 
that time to establish either a policy or to prepare for an organization. ('onsequenily 
it was left to Mr. Chase. 

Admiral A. T. Mahan, United States Navy (retired), made a stnte- 
ment in part as follows: 

The general purpose of the bill seems to me excellent. It would compel the delib¬ 
eration in common of a number of men whose specialties are closely allied actually, 
but are not brought into formal cooperation, as the bill provides they shall hereafter 
be. For the information of each member of the council, and of the whole as a body, 
and for the subsequent formulation of measures, this method is superior to the appear¬ 
ance of experts before a committee, though it doubtless will not supersede that. 
Experts before a committee are liky witnesses in a box, and confine themselves very 
closely to the matter in hand, whereas in discussion between equals many collateral 
facts and considerations transpire because of the freedom of range. Time is not 
thereby lost, at least to any greater extent than the half-informed questionings of 
those who are eliciting statements from a witness. I believe that Congress, the ulti¬ 
mate arbiter in matters of military provision, would be enabled to judge much better 
through the institution of this proposed council. 

As to questions of detail, I have very little to suggest. The proposed composition 
of the council, by ex officio members, seems to me very judicious. 

It has been justly remarked (Corbett’s Seven Years War) that the strength of Great 
Britain’s action in that war was that the three allied functions—diplomacy, army, 
and navy—were in one hand. In my judgment, they should all be represented in 
the proposed council. 

Commander Frank Kinsey Hill, United States Navy, of the Naval 
War College, made a statement in part as follows: 

* * * A war will be properly carried on when the statesmen who control the 

steps preceding and subsequent to war work with and sustain the two military branches 
in harmonious plans during war, which plans are drawn to further the policies which 
caused the war: and, further, that it is necessary for the military commanders to study 
and broadly comprehend the policies of governments, so that their plans will fit the 
ends to be attained. * * * Now, unless the statesmen will tell us what the poli¬ 

cies are we can not make proper strategic plans. I would like to illustrate this in one 
case with regard to Russia and Japan. The Russian statesmen did not coordinate 
with the army or navy. They did not know that a war was coming on between 
those two countries, as a matter of fact. The result was that they did not have the 
Russian forces in place to fight at the beginning of the war. The result was that Russia 
was defeated up to the time of the treaty. It is now considered by many that if war 
had been continued for a few months longer Russia would have prevailed. But lack 


12 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


of harmony between the Russian statesmen and the Russian army and navy con- 
manders caused the defeat of that country. Another case, if you wish, is the Boer 
War, when exactly the same thing happened. * * * Having established a policy, 

then it is next the business of the military officers to state the necessities for their 
branches to carry out the policy. 

There is one other question which was asked several times by the chairman, and 
that is the question of economy, and the answers were wholly based on the economy 
due to coordination and a directive force. I consider that two economies will result, 
and the one named is the minor one. The largest economy which will ever come from 
this bill will result from our being so prepared for war that the enemy will decide 
not to have war with us, We would save a couple of billion dollars and several hundred 
thousand lives over and above the few millions which we could save by this fixing 
up of the stations, as mentioned by Gen. Wotherspoon. * * * 

NJWe thus see that a definite responsibility can and ought to be fixed; first, for the 
decision as to what the policies of the Government will be; second, for the recommen¬ 
dation concerning the forces necessary to carry out the policies; third, for the ap¬ 
propriations necessary to provide these forces; and, fourth, for the right use of these 
forces by the military and naval commanders after they have been provided. The 
people of the United States, who delegate power to carry on the Government, should 
be thoroughly informed as to the various responsibilities, so that the credit for success 
or odium for failure should rest where it belongs. * * * 

War, being the result of policies enforced, should be based on strategic plans 1o 
gain certain definite ends. For instance, if the United States had a policy of extension 
of territory by absorption of Canada, the war would be directed so as to gain military 
control of that territory, and if the war ended successfully for the United States, 
the treaty would probably cede to them such territory as was held under military 
control at the end of the war. 

It is thus seen that the strategic objective of a war must rightly comprehend a 
knowledge of the policies which preceded war and contemplate the treaty which is 
to conclude the war. 


CONCLUSIONS. 

War is not independent of political considerations, but must be outlined and carried 
on with due regard to these considerations. That to properly outline the war the three 
branches of the Government (State, War, and Navy Departments) should act in 
conjunction, and that peace preparation in anticipation of war should be the joint 
action of Congress, the War and the Navy Departments. 

Finally, both the peace preparations and war will best be carried out by a national 
board for war comprised of units representing both branches of Congress and the 
Departments of State, War, and Navy. 

The three greatest authorities on the art of war are Jomini, 
Olouseuritz, and Von der Goltz. 

Von der Goltz says: 

t pon policy the whole condition, the feeling, the constitution, and the moral and 
physical affairs of a State depend; and upon these depends, again, the waging of 
war. 

Policy, again, regulates the relations not merely of those States immediately con¬ 
cerned, but also those of such as are indirectly interested in the final issue. Their 
favor or disfavor may be of very great significance, impeding the course of events or 
promoting them. Politics, again, as a rule determine the moment for the outbreak of 
hostilities, upon the happy choice of which much depends. They, in short, create 
the general situation, in which the State enters into the struggle, and this will be of 
material influence upon the decisions and attitude of the commander in chief, and 
even upon the general esprit of the army. * * * 

\\ ar serves politics both before and after. W ar waged only for annihilation and 
destruction is in these days inconceivable. An end and aim that is of permanent 
value to the State, be it only a question of ascendancy, must be existent; and this 
can only arise from political considerations. 

The object of a war is of such importance and will be of such lasting effect upon the 
exertions which nations make to attain it that we ought, almost on this account alone 
to place policy first among conditions of success. Now, as we have here pointed 
out. many motives are also attendant, and thus we may without hesitation lav down 
■a maxim that without a good policy a successful war is*not probable. * * * 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


13 


Clouseuritz says: 

Thus therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the 
standard lor determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of 
. effort to be made. * * * 

We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances war is to be regarded 
not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking 
tins point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military 
history. 1 his is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible. 
Secondly, this view shows us how wars must differ in character according to the nature 
of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed. 

Now, the first, the grandest, and mostdecisive actof judgment which the statesman 
and general exercise is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he 
engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which by the 
nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is therefore the first', the 
most comprehensive, of all strategical questions. 

Jomini says: 

The art of war consists of six distinct parts: 

(1) Statesmanship in its relation to war. 

(2) Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either 
for defense or for invasion. 

(3) Grand tactics. 

(4 ) Logistics, or the art of moving armies. 

(5) Engineering the attack and defense of fortifications. 

(6) Minor tactics. 

******* 
STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR. 

Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes 
whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various 
operations necessary to attain the object of the war. 

War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but 
great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, 
which should depend upon the circumstances of the case. 

To these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may 
be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. The name ‘‘ military 
policy” is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to 
strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a 
general. 

Col. Henderson, of the British Army, in his book, The Science of 
War, says: 

While a statesman may be competent to appreciate the general principles of the 
projects of operations laid before him, he should never attempt to frame a project for 
himself. * * * 

But political and financial considerations may not present themselves in quite 
the same light to the soldier as to the statesman, and the latter is bound to make 
certain that they have received due attention. If, however, modifications are neces¬ 
sary, they should be made before the plan of campaign is finally approved, and in 
any case the purely military considerations should be most carefully weighed. It 
should be remembered that an unfavorable political situation is best redeemed by a 
decisive victory, while a reverse will do more to shake confidence in the Government 
than even the temporary surrender of some portion of the national domains. “Be 
sure before striking” and “reculer pour mieux sauter” are both admirable maxims; 
but their practical application requires a thorough appreciation of the true principles 
of war and a very large degree of moral courage, both in the soldier who suggests and 
in the statesman who approves. If, however, the soldier and the statesman are 
supported by an enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realize that 
patience is to be preferred to precipitation, that retreat, though inglorious, is not 
necessarily humiliating, their task is very considerably lightened. 

The question of the constitutionality of this measure was referred 
to the Attorney General, who gave an opinion as follows: 

I see no constitutional objection to the proposed measure. It merely empowers a 
number of officials—some in the executive and some in the legislative department— 


14 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


to meet and recommend to the President ‘‘ such measures relating to the national 
defense as it shall deem necessary and expedient.” I suppose that the President might 
without any act of Congress cali together the same officials and discuss with them any 
measure of government in which he is interested. As a matter of fact, that is what 
he does with respect to important legislation of any kind. Take the various con¬ 
ferences that the President had with the members of the executive and the legisla¬ 
tive branches of the Government regarding the railroad legislation two years ago, and 
with respect to the tariff. 

I know of nothing in the Constitution to interfere with such legislation as is pro¬ 
posed by this bill. 

A precedent for associating together members of the different 
branches of the Government is found in the act establishing the, 
Smithsonian Institution and the Board of Regents of that institution. 

Under the act of March 12, 1894, the President, Vice President, and 
Chief Justice of the United States are associated together in the 
charter body, and under section 5580, Revised Statutes, the Vice 
President, members of the Cabinet, the Chief Justice, and six Mem¬ 
bers of Congress, three from the Senate and three from the House, 
are associated together on the Board of Regents. 

Every bill signed by the President is the joint work of the two 
branches of the Government. The complete separation of authority 
lodged in the two branches of the Government will be no more effected 
by joint action in the council than it is by joint action upon bills. 
The advantages of having the wisdom of both branches invoked in 
determining policies of national defense are even greater than in 
determining the usual laws. 

Indeed, it is inherently impossible to attain a high degree of effect¬ 
iveness in policies of national defense without bringing together the 
two branches of the Government. 

The chief original purpose of the separation of the two branches 
of the Government was to avoid combining the powers of the two in 
the same man or group of men. Such a combination does not in the 
remotest degree result from the council. 

No member of the executive branch is given any legislative power, 
nor is any member of the legislative branch given any executive 
power. In fact, the authority of the council is only advisory, and 
before any of its reports can be effective the recommendations made 
must be acted on by Congress and by the Executive. 

The very fact that our two branches of Government, legislative and 
.executive, are so entirely distinct, so much so that a member of the 
Cabinet may not even address the Houses of Congress and a Member 
of Congress may not hold an executive office, makes it far more 
imperative in America than in any other great country to establish 
a council of national defense in which the divergent branches may 
meet. Unity, continuity, and harmony are otherwise impossible, and 
without these there can be neither effectiveness nor economy. 

The investigations of military authorities, notably the late Gen. 
Upton, show conclusively that the lack of a well-developed policy 
and the lack of harmony in our past wars are chiefly responsible for 
the larger part of our sacrifices of blood and treasure and for most of 
our reverses, if not for the wars themselves, while the hearings 
before this committee on this bill show clearly the same lack to be 
at the bottom of the high cost and lack of efficiency in our Militarv 
Establishment in time of peace. * 

George Washington, in a letter to the President of Congress, dated 
August 20, 1780, sets forth the serious and all but fatal consequences 





COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


15 


of a lack of a real definite policy of defense during the Revolutionary 
V\ ar. He says: 

Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning which, by the continuance of 
the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had 
to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate 
of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we 
should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes 
scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every 
moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we 
should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal 
number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious 
army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the 
enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should 
not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main 
army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the 
reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as 
to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their 
security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; 
we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted 
for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing 
inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the 
country was completely able to afford, and of seeing Ihe country ravaged, our towns 
burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same 
cause. 

Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the 
embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derange¬ 
ment of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war and 
the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part 
of the time two sets of men to feed and pay—the discharged men going home and the 
levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The diffi¬ 
culty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among 
the present lines we find there are some who have received $150 in specie for five 
months’ service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of per¬ 
forming the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed 
to the business, that by the time they have taught these men the rudiments of a 
soldier’s duty their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a 
new set. The consumption of provisions, arms, accouterments, and stores of every 
kind has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the 
cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to mili¬ 
tia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by 
such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the 
cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occa¬ 
sioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours order 
and economy have been impracticable. No person who has been a close observer of 
the progress of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated without com¬ 
parison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done 
otherwise. 

There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. 
Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctu¬ 
ation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a 
considerable part of it they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. 
Had we kept a permanent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope 
for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since. 

Tn a subsequent letter to the President of the Congress, dated 
September 15, 1780, he says: 

I am happy to find that the last disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its 
first features indicated. This event, however, adds itself to many others to exem¬ 
plify the necessity of an army and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. 
Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense 
as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. 
No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even 
those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in 
the woods and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness 
requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course 
of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that 


16 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liber¬ 
ties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a 
dependence. I can not but remark that it gives me pain to find the measures pursu¬ 
ing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of 
once for all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the 
true system of war at the southward, the object ought to be to have a good army 
rather than a large one. 

The late Gen. Upton, perhaps the greatest military authority in 
America, in his book on “The Military Policy of the United States/ 7 
in summing up the conclusions as to the War of 1812, says: 

The lessons of the war are so obvious that they need not be stated. Nearly all the 
blunders committed were repetitions in an aggravated form of the same blunders in 
the Revolution, and like them had their origin either in the mistakes or omissions of 
military legislation. 

In the war under the Confederation Congress in its own name could not raise a 
dollar, nor arm and equip a single soldier. Under the Constitution, it had the sov¬ 
ereign authority to call forth the entire financial and military resources of the people. 

In one war, with a debt of $200,000,000 the Nation became bankrupt at the end of 
five years; in the other, a debt of nearly equal magnitude was contracted in two and 
one-half years. 

In the first war, notwithstanding the steady decline of our military strength, two 
British armies of more than 6.000 men each, were made captive; in the other, less than 
5,000 men, for the period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory, 
and successfully withstood the misapplied power of 7,000.000 of people. 

These ideas were concurred in by Gen. James A. Garfield and by 
Gen. William T. Sherman, who penciled the following notes on 
Gen. Upton’s original manuscript: 


•‘I renew the suggestion that a further statement of the composition of the British 
forces against us ought to be made. 


“J. A. G." 


•‘A compliance with Gen. Garfield's suggestion will strengthen your argument. 
Many strong men will contest your conclusions by charging the lamentable failure 
of the War of 1812 to other causes than false legislation ; to want of skill by generals 
and officers, such as the want of concert of action and dispersion of our strength, the 
want of men of action as leaders, rather than want of wisdom in council. I doubt if 
you will convince the powers that be, but the facts stated, the references from author¬ 
ity, and the military conclusions are most valuable, and should be printed and made 
accessible. The time may not be now. but will come, when these will be appreciated, 
and may bear fruit even in our day. 

“W. T. Sherman.” 


Gen. Upton in the same work points out the similar consequences 
in the Florida War, 1836-1843, in which over 40,000 troops were 
engaged. The 4,000 Regulars engaged alone lost 1,500 men. Fie 
says: 

For want of a well-defined peace organization, a nation of 17.000,000 of people con¬ 
tended for some years with 1.200 warriors and finally closed the struggle without 
accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians, which was the original and sole 
cause of the war. 

Gen. Upton is authority for the statement that the Mexican War, 
though successful, was longer than should have been required and 
exposed both the army of Gen. Taylor and the army of Gen. Scott 
to unnecessary peril. The events attending the 'annexation of 
Texas caused a degree of preparation for this war excelling anything 
in our previous annals. We were fortunate in the ability and experi¬ 
ence of our officers, and their determining influence was felt as much 
in the preparations as in the battles. A crude approximation to a 
definite policy in this war, as compared with previous wars, was 
rewarded by an unbroken series of victories. 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


17 


It remained for the Civil War to bring out the staggering price in 
blood and treasure a nation may pay for having no definite policy of 
defense. * 

Capt. J. M. Palmer, of the General Staff, investigating the causes 
that led up to this war, drew the conclusion that the utter lack of a 
military policy and of preparation on the part of the Union is the 
real responsible cause of the war. He says in Scribner’s Magazine, 
February, 1912: 

A study of the period immediately preceding the Civil War reveals that secession 
was a formal and carefully preconceived act. * * * The southern people took the 
step that meant war simply because they thought that they could win. It must be 
remembered that Jefferson Davis was not only a trained soldier, but an ex-Secretary 
of W ar of the l nited States. As a trained soldier he knew what military institutions 
should be, and as a Secretary of War of the United States he had learned what mili¬ 
tary institutions should not be. He knew that the United States was unprepared 
for war, he knew that it had no intelligent military policy, and he knew that know- 
nothingism in military affairs was cultivated as a positive civic virtue among northern 
politicians. He knew that the North had greater resources of wealth and population, 
but he knew that the war must be a war of subjugation, and as a trained military 
expert he knew that a war of subjugation can not be successfully waged by raw levies. 
He realized that the southern armies must also be largely untrained at first, but he 
was acquainted with the scientific fact that troops can be trained to defend long before 
they can be trained to conquer. He knew also that the military situation would 
impose a policy of invasion upon the North and that invasion would largely neutralize 
the advantage of superior numbers. 

Mr. Davis and his associates also knew the military history of the United States to 
be a history of legislative incapacity. They knew that Washington considered the 
British army to be a much less formidable obstacle to success than the stupid military 
policy of the Continental Congress. * * * They knew that in the War of 1812, 
a war conducted on Jeffersonian principles, 16,000 British soldiers had been able to 
prevent 500,000 Americans from conquering Canada. They knew that during the 
Mexican War Gen. Taylor was left with only 5,000 men to bear the brunt of Buena 
Vista, and that when Gen. Scott was within three days’ march of the City of Mexico, 
with victory behind him and final victory within his grasp, he was deprived of half 
of his little army on account of an oft-repeated legislative blunder. They knew that 
in all of our wars the American soldier has been called upon to win in spite of an 
unintelligent military statesmanship, and they did not believe that with such mili¬ 
tary institutions as these the North could successfully undertake the conquest of 
5,000,000 Americans. 

Such was the logical estimate of the military situation. The appeal to arms was 
made by the southern leaders because in all human probability their cause would 
succeed. And they were almost right. But they failed to estimate the marvelous 
endurance of the northern people, who, spite of defeat, spite of unprecedented 
wastes of their blood and treasure, and spite of an unenlightened military policy, clung 
to the fearful burden of the war and bore it to the bitter end. 

The Civil War was a long and protracted struggle because it takes two years to con¬ 
vert armed mobs into armies, and until that conversion is complete there can be no 
decisive scientific military action. It was indeed fortunate for the United States that 
in this war its antagonist also began operations with an armed mob instead of an army. 

Our analysis of the facts of the Civil War has thus far led us to two important con¬ 
clusions: First, that efforts to prevent it judicially were vain, and, second, that the 
undoubted proximate cause of the war was the military unpreparedness of the United 
States. * * * At the close of 1860 the Regular Army of the United States comprised 
16,367 officers and enlisted men. This force consisted of 198 companies, and of these 
183 companies were stationed on the Mexican and Indian frontier or were en route 
to distant posts west of the Mississippi. The 15 remaining companies were employed 
in guarding the Canadian frontier and the Atlantic coast from Maine to the Gulf of 
Mexico. 

On October 29, 1860, in view of the “imminent danger of a disruption of the Union 
by the secession of one or more of the States,” Gen. Scott recommended that Forts 
Moultrie and Monroe and other southern forts be reenforced in order to prevent their 
capture by a coup de main or surprise. In a postscript added to his letter to the Sec¬ 
retary of War, he stated that the forces of the United States available for the purpose 
were only five companies, stationed as follows: One company at Boston, one company 

H. Kept. 584, 62-2-2 


18 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


at the Narrows (New York Harbor), one company at Pittsburgh, one company at 
Augusta, Ga., and one company at Baton Rouge. These five scattered companies, 
comprising about 400 men, constituted the total military force of the United States 
available for any sudden emergency. * * * 

The propriety of reenforcing the southern forts was carefully considered by Mr. 
Buchanan and his Cabinet, but the project was overruled, and thereupon the Secretary 
of War, Gen. Cass, resigned. 

But in its decision the administration of Mr. Buchanan should not be criticized 
without weighing the means at his disposal. The demands of the military situation 
were very clear. Prompt and decisive military action must have terminated the 
crisis, but prompt and decisive military action is not to be expected of a nation that 
has no military power. A vigorous national policy could hardly be supported by 
five scattered companies numbering 400 men. The tone of the southern leaders at 
this time was one of contempt for the weakness of the Federal Government. Their 
contempt was justified by the facts, and out of their contempt grew war. * * * 
The total cost of the Civil War to date has been over $9,000,000,000. It might have 
been prevented by an appropriation of $5,000,000 per annum from 1850 to 1860. 
But though it has already cost $9,000,000,000, it is still costing over $160,000,000 per 
annum for pensions on account of preventable military service, death, and suffering. 
In view of its consequences, was the military retrenchment of the “fifties” a true 
economy? For every dollar spared from the proper military budget of 1860 we have 
so far paid $1,800, and we are still paying $32 a year almost half a century after the war. 
And this is the traditional military policy of the United States. * * * 

Although our analysis of the causes of the Civil War has necessarily been brief, it 
throws a suggestive light on several phases of the profound problem of war and peace. 
We find that the controversies that led to the Civil War were first brought before a 
competent tribunal, but that judicial action even under the most favorable circum¬ 
stances was unable to prevent the appeal to arms. We find, however, upon further 
examination that the war in all human probability was a preventable struggle and 
that the proper preventive measure was simply Washington’s classical remedy, 
preparedness for war. 

We also find a remarkable illustration of the vast difference that exists between 
military retrenchment and military economy. Economy always demands efficiency, 
no matter how much efficiency may cost, and retrenchment at the expense of effi¬ 
ciency is never economy. Because our fathers ignored this truth, we are still paying 
thirtyfold for an unintelligent retrenchment of 60 years ago. 

There can be no doubt that the lack of a definite policy, the lack of 
harmony and organization, at the outbreak of the War with Spain 
are the chief causes of the heavy toll of life and health paid to disease, 
fourteen times that paid to bullets, though the bulk of our forces 
never left our own shores. 

In fact, this lack of a defense policy is no doubt the real cause of the 
war itself. Any rational policy would have dictated our holding 
control of the sea as the Cuban question grew more acute. Ten 
million dollars put into ships in the early nineties would have insured 
this control and would have guaranteed the settlement of the Cuban 
controversy by diplomacy. With control of the sea there would 
have been no war. As soon as we gained control of the sea the war 
ended. A few millions of dollars put out in pursuance of a policy 
would have saved hundreds of millions poured out in war. 

America has 30,000,000 of her citizens and $37,000,000,000 of her 
property exposed to naval attack. We have an expanding foreign 
commerce coming more and more in competition with the commerce 
of the great military powers of Europe and Asia. We propose to 
maintain the Monroe doctrine and insist on the “ open-door policy,” 
and are pledged to maintain the neutrality of the Panama Canal. 
Our possessions, whether to our liking or not, are spread all over the 
Pacific Ocean, placing us in the vortex of the world’s politics. There 
is no choice. We must make adequate provision tor self-defense. 


COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


19 


This can not be done with efficiency and economy without a proper 
agency. This bill establishes such an agency without creating any 
new offices, and practically without entailing any additional expense. 
The committee unanimously recommends its passage at an early date. 

The great weakness of our Nation from the standpoint of national 
defense has been the want of a definite policy and the want of coopera¬ 
tion between the various agencies involved. This bill makes up for 
this weakness and will promote economy and efficiency in peace and 
increases the chances or victory in war. 


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